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Abstract 
The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international level has meant that softer 
codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. The Global Compact is the most ambitious of 
these codes, created with a desire to engage business in the project of international development 
and thus develop a global governance structure for corporate social responsibility. 
 
Soft law instruments, such as voluntary standards and framework agreements have been roundly 
criticised for being vague and indistinct and creating commitments that may be subjective, 
tentative and conditional. However, what appears to be lacking in the existing literature is a 
critical analysis of the governance structures created by a voluntary regulatory instrument like 
the Global Compact using a framework capable of both assessing the initiative’s merits and 
weaknesses, and tracing its development. Through examining the use of soft law by the Global 
Compact, we argue that although many question or dismiss its non-binding approach, it provides 
an illustrative example of the benefits of soft law over harder forms of legislation.  
 
One of the most important lessons to take from the case study is that the use of soft law as a 
global governance structure of corporate social responsibility should not be dismissed as a ‘Plan 
B’ in the event that harder law is not practical. Corporate social responsibility is a relatively 
recent phenomenon; clear benefits exist in starting an international regulatory mechanism at the 
softer end of the legalization spectrum, before toughening up later on.  
3 
 
Introduction: Business increasingly shapes the Global Domain 
 
“Transnational corporations are increasing their influence over the economic, political 
and cultural life of humanity whilst remaining almost completely unaccountable to global 
civil society.
3”  
 
The rising influence of multinational corporations is now widely accepted in contemporary 
international law and public policy scholarship. As James Rosenau observed twenty years ago, 
‘[t]he very notion of “international relations” seems obsolete in the face of an apparent trend in 
which more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct 
involvement of nations or states.’4 Multinationals have emerged as the most powerful actor in a 
new global civil society; the biggest beneficiary of a post-Cold War reconstitution of the global 
public domain.  Along with international nongovernmental organisations and other increasingly 
powerful non-state actors, big businesses now vie for power on the international stage, a 
development which has led to the abandonment by many of more traditional state-centric 
perspectives.
5
 By the turn of the last century, multinationals accounted for 51 of the largest 100 
economic entities in the world, and a quarter of global output.
6
 Given this enormous resource 
capacity, some scholars have even started to view multinationals as an emerging type of ‘private 
authority’ that has the capability of usurping roles traditionally associated with the state.7  
 
The importance in keeping companies in check through global corporate social responsibility 
initiatives is difficult to overstate. Businesses have the capacity to both benefit and cause great 
harm to their surrounding environment. As Andrew Kuper argues, ‘[a]n outlook that ignores 
corporations... strikes most informed commentators as fiddling while Rome burns.’8 The specific 
resources and competencies of large-scale companies must be harnessed to ensure cheap and 
efficient delivery of socially beneficial services.  
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives have risen to prominence because of a 
discrepancy between the social costs caused by companies and the scrutiny they face in dealing 
with those costs.
9
 The concept of CSR is amorphous, with definitions ranging from mere 
corporate compliance with legal obligations to those involving active and voluntary engagement 
in socially beneficial behaviour.
10
 However one chooses to define the concept, the key point is 
that the growing influence of companies at an international level has triggered heightened 
societal expectations of corporate behaviour. There is, in short, a growing sense that businesses 
need to accept greater responsibility for their actions.
11
 
 
So, how can multinational corporations be held accountable for their actions? How can their 
unrivalled global capacity be harnessed and utilised in the most effective way possible? In other 
words, how can we develop global governance structures that are relevant to the new economic 
realities of our times?  
 
In this article we state the case for the role of soft law mechanisms in the regulation of large 
corporations. Soft law instruments, such as voluntary standards and framework agreements have 
been roundly criticised for being ‘vague and indistinct, creating commitments that may be 
subjective, tentative and conditional.’12 However, what appears to be lacking in the existing 
literature is a critical analysis of the norms created by a voluntary regulatory instrument like the 
Global Compact (GC) using a framework capable of both assessing the initiative’s merits and 
weaknesses, and tracing its development. Through examining the use of soft law by the GC, we 
argue that although many question or dismiss its non-binding approach,
13
 it provides an 
illustrative example of the benefits of soft law over harder forms of global governance. This 
proves particularly beneficial for the governance of corporate social responsibility of 
multinational companies.  
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The Legalization Spectrum: From Soft Law to Hard Law 
 
It is important to define the most basic concepts of soft and hard law at the outset.  Hard law has 
been defined as consisting of ‘norms creating precise legal rights and obligations.’14 Soft law, by 
contrast, has been described as consisting of ‘rules of conduct which, in principle, have no 
legally binding force but which may nevertheless have practical effects.’15 No binary choice 
exists between soft and hard law; it is better to regard these two forms of legalization as ideal 
types sitting at opposite ends of a ‘continuum with numerous graduations.’16 We shall be 
referring to this continuum as the ‘legalization spectrum’. 
 
What factors determine the ‘softness’ or ‘hardness’ of a rule? In their seminal article, Kenneth 
Abbott and Snidal suggest that rules can be broken down into three different dimensions: 
‘obligation’, ‘precision’ and ‘delegation.’17 ‘Obligation’ simply refers to the extent to which 
actors are legally bound by the rule in question. Ideal-typical soft law does not confer binding 
legal obligations, unlike its hard law counterpart. The ‘precision’ dimension refers to the detail in 
which the rule governing the actor in question is set out, both in terms of the objective and the 
method by which to achieve it. In this respect, soft law is identifiable by the deliberately vague 
nature of the obligations imposed
18
 and the consequent discretion left to the parties being 
regulated.
19
 Thus, the term ‘precision’ seeks to determine the degree to which the rules in place 
specify (a) the intended objective and (b) the means by which this should be achieved. A 
‘precise’ rule is clear and unambiguous.20 ‘Delegation’ refers firstly to the degree to which third 
parties have been delegated the responsibilities of interpreting, implementing and applying the 
rules. Secondly, it refers to the degree to which such parties have been delegated the 
responsibility for resolving disputes. The degree of enforcement plays a crucial role in 
determining the degree of ‘delegation.’ At the ‘engagement’ end, strategies focus around 
engaging companies in dialogue; encouraging (and sometimes pressuring) them to sign up to 
voluntary initiatives in which companies undertake to provide a living wage for their employees. 
‘Confrontation’ tactics involve holding socially irresponsible companies to account through such 
means as boycotting and litigation proceedings. ‘Documentation of abuses and moral shaming’ is 
                                                 
14
 Weil, P. (1983) ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ The American Journal 
of International Law 77: 414 
15
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International Organization 54 (3): 421-456 
18
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19
 Gruchalla-Wesierski, T. (1984) ‘A Framework for Understanding Soft Law’ McGill Law 
Journal 30: 37 
20
  Abbott, K. and Snidal, D. (2000) ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ 
International Organization 54 (3): 412 
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positioned the halfway point on this spectrum, giving thus way to a ‘moderate’ degree of 
‘delegation’ on the Legalization spectrum.21 
 
Under this framework, each of the three dimensions of legalization has its own continuous 
sliding scale. The higher a rule scores across the three dimensions, the harder it is, hence the 
higher it will sit on the overall spectrum.
22
 In adopting this analytical framework, we reject the 
notion of a specific threshold at which ‘hard law’ is suddenly born.23 Given the myriad different 
forms of legalization employed throughout the international arena,
24
 and the diverse range of 
institutions which can generate these forms, we submit that it is impossible to identify any such 
universally applicable threshold with any kind of certainty. Rules can be placed accurately on the 
three sliding scales (obligation, precision and delegation) as well as on the overall spectrum (see 
diagram below). 
What distinguishes Soft Law from Hard Law?
The Legalization Spectrum
In Practice: Smooth Transitions, rather than a Dichotomy
Obligation
Non legal Norm
No law making authority
Precision
Vague Principle
Imprecise
General Norms
Delegation
Diplomacy
Political Bargaining
Informal Conciliation
Obligation
Binding, Unconditional Legal
Sanctions for Enforcement
Precision
Precise, Highly Elaborated,
Narrow scope for Interpretation
Delegation
International court or similar
Dispute Resolution by 
Binding Third Parties
Prototypical Soft Law
Prototypical Hard Law
Adapted from Abbott & Snidal, 2000
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How this Study Was Conducted 
 
This framework has been chosen because it emphasises the fact that any perception of a ‘soft 
law/ hard law’ dichotomy is illusory and misguided, and underlines the continuous nature of the 
legalization spectrum. For the purpose of this essay, it also serves to illustrate the transition made 
by the norms generated by the Global Compact, from almost prototypical soft law at its inception 
to rules occupying a more moderate position on the overall legalization spectrum. The Global 
Compact was selected as a case study because it constitutes the single most ambitious 
international code for the governance of corporate social responsibility. Other codes of conduct, 
such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976, revised 2000), the Caux 
Round Table Principles (1994) or the WHO/UNICEF code for transnational corporations have 
failed to achieve the degree of internationalization as the Global Compact has.
25
 The same can be 
said for various private sector self regulatory initiatives for corporate social responsibility, which 
lack the degree of authority enjoyed by the United Nations. Further, the institutionalization of the 
Global Compact illustrates the U.N.’s recognition of corporations as an important emerging actor 
in the international system. The strategy adopted of the Global Compact thus serves as the 
primary instructive template for international voluntary initiatives, both in the area of corporate 
social responsibility and beyond. 
 
Because all qualitative techniques rely on the gathering of reliable and timely information, we 
emphasized the generation of concrete empirical information and the illustration of current 
mechanisms. In doing so, we used an ‘outside-in’ perspective so to assess the systematic effects 
of the potential or actual application of Soft Law by the Compact. When determining the 
application of a governance structure, it is good practice to combine technical and legislative 
information from a number of sources. It is then necessary to reflect endogenous-induced 
changes in the use of a governance structure so to determine its potential, before singling out the 
various impact factors so to clearly discern their benefits and pitfalls and associate them with 
desired outcomes. Thus, our study is based on an analysis of the Global Compact’s website, all 
relevant reports that the Global Compact (including those that the United Nations Secretariat has 
issued in this context in the last decade), the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (1974),
26
 the various speeches of the U.N. Secretary General at the time, Kofi 
Annan, relevant press releases by the Compact and the U.N. Secretariat, as well as all further 
publications by the Global Compact itself. In doing so, we sought to capture in qualitative terms 
the global governance structures provided by the Compact. We examined the available 
information and collected further secondary sources, particularly academic publications, helping 
to determine and document the implementation of Soft Law by the Compact. At stages when a 
number of options (each with its own summary, analysis & evidence page) were considered, we 
opted for a single evidence base, addressing clearly our subject of analysis. Our evidence base 
                                                 
25
 OECD (2010) The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterpriseshttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/21/1903291.pdf;  CAUX (2010): The Caux 
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thus sought to address any uncertainties associated with the Soft Law mechanisms of the Global 
Compact.  
 
In a second step we assessed the empirical data through the prism of analysis provided by Abbott 
and Snidal,
27
 so to monitor and document the evolution of the soft law mechanisms of the 
Compact. This methodological framework was chosen for its conceptual clarity as well as 
originality. To our knowledge it is the first of its kind to systematically define what elements 
determine the degree of ‘hardness’ of a law.  We assessed these by referring to a mixture of 
analytical and narrative methods, as well as with reference to research that supports the 
formulation of our hypothesis that since its inception the GC has moved from a purely soft law 
position to a moderately more advanced position on the legalization spectrum. We recognize 
however that certain changes may have occurred because of a further increase of international 
economic integration, lying outside the realm of our analysis. We have the aspiration that our 
findings may offer additional indicators that allow to discuss the impact and relevance of the 
Compact’s use of Soft Law as a Governance Structure. Thus, they must stand up to external 
scrutiny; i.e. they should be accessible to the reader, and external parties with an interest must be 
able to contest the findings. 
 
The Soft Law Mechanisms of the Global Compact  
 
The practical impossibility of employing hard law at an international level has meant that softer 
codes of conduct have stepped in to fill the void. The Global Compact (GC) is the most 
ambitious of these codes, created with a desire to include rather than alienate companies. The GC 
reflects an eagerness on the part of the U.N. to engage businesses in the project of international 
development, and highlights the ‘pendulum swing away from stricter forms of regulation’28 at 
the international level. Its mandate recently reaffirmed by a new U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution,
29
 the Compact employs soft (though increasingly more moderate) forms of 
legalization to ‘leverage the platform’ of large corporations30 and encourage socially responsible 
corporate behaviour. It has been aptly characterised as a ‘standardised ethics initiative.’31 
Corporate participants are required to ‘embrace, support and enact’ ten principles in the areas of 
human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption.  
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 Abbott, K. and Snidal, D., ibid 
28
  Utting, P. (2000) Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, New York: United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development: 30 
29
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The initiative operates on a purely voluntary basis; companies sign up simply by completing an 
online form and sending a letter of commitment, approved by its board, from its CEO to the U.N. 
Secretary-General expressing its desire to participate.
32
 Other stakeholders include NGOs, 
academia, labour associations and stock exchanges.
33
 The Compact relies on ‘public 
accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labour and civil 
society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which [it] is 
based.’34 It has been observed that the ten fundamental principles serve as ‘macro contracts’ 
defining the responsibilities of the participant companies, whilst at a micro-level, local networks 
are developed between participating firms and other stakeholders.  
The Ten Principles for Corporate Social Behaviour issued by the Global Compact 
 
1) Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights. 
2) Businesses should make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
3) Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining. 
4) Businesses should eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labour. 
5) Businesses should ensure the effective abolition of child labour. 
6) Businesses should ensure the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. . 
7) Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges. 
8) Businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. 
9) Businesses should encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. 
10) Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery  
 
These are based on existing norms espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption respectively. 
 
The Compact’s lack of enforceability is viewed by many as a fundamental weakness of the 
initiative.
35
 The GC has been strongly criticised for not demanding a higher degree of 
accountability from its corporate participants
36
 and for lacking the ability to sanction those 
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 Global Compact (2010) at:  
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/Business_Participation/index.html 
33
 Fritsch, S.  ibid: 17 
34
  Blanpain, R. and Colucci, M. (2004) The Globalization of Labour Standards: The Soft Law 
Track, The Hague: Kluwer International Law School: 41 
35
 Cohen, J. (2001) ‘The World’s Business: The United Nations and the Globalisation of 
Corporate Citizenship’, in Andriof, J. and McIntosh, M. (eds) Perspectives on Corporate 
Citizenship, Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing: 196 
36
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The Ten Principles for Corporate Social Behaviour issued by the Global Compact 
 
1) Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights. 
2) Businesses should make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses. 
3) Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining. 
4) Businesses should eliminate all forms of forced and compulsory labour. 
5) Businesses should ensure the effective abolition of child labour. 
6) Businesses should ensure the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.  
7) Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges. 
8) Businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility. 
9) Businesses should encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly 
technologies. 
10) Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.  
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failing to live up to their commitments.
37
 Referring to Corporate Social Responsibility projects 
undertaken by signatories to the Compact in India, Aruna Das Gupta argues that ‘[i]ndividual 
and collaborative initiatives continue to be dominated by self-assertion rather than 
accountability.’38 Critics of the Compact assert that companies can only be made accountable 
through legally enforceable obligations, and that softer forms of legalization such as voluntary 
Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives are ‘no substitute for the legislative actions of a 
recognised political authority’39 given the ‘lack of any basis for legal claims or redress’ under 
such initiatives.
40
 These critics reached a peek in spring 2010. British Oil giant ‘BP’ had been a 
member of the Global Compact since 2000 and systematically complied with all the 
requirements set out by the Compact. Yet, in spite of that BP caused a major oil leak in the Gulf 
of Mexico in early 2010.
41
 
 
In the face of such condemnations, critics tend to further dismiss the Compact as a public 
relations gimmick;
42
 an example of companies lobbying for ‘business friendly (sic) pseudo-
solutions’ to the social costs they create, instead of enforceable rules.43 Critiques thus call for 
rules to replace the voluntary approach,
44
 and pressure the U.N. to ‘have its own system of 
complaints and adjudications, which could conduct investigations to a standard that would have 
legal standing.’45 However such criticism fails to appreciate the advantages soft law presents in 
this context. Voluntary initiatives like the Global Compact compensate for their lack of binding 
authority through a variety of mechanisms. We now examine these mechanisms using the 
legalization spectrum as our analytical framework. NGOs for example have criticized the Global 
Compact for admitting firms such as ‘Anglo American’ or ‘Petro China.’ According to critics 
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41
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Paper Series 22: 12 
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both firms do not act in a corporate socially responsible way. The NGO ‘Action Aid’ blames 
‘Anglo American’ for allegedly operating gold mines in Ghana that cause severe ecological and 
social damages. Equally, the company ‘Petro China’ has been associated with providing funding 
to the most controversial Sudanese Government.
46
 A search of GC participating companies also 
shows that many alcohol producing firms participate in the initiative. We could not identify a 
statement on behalf of the GC how the participation of such firms can be matched to the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO) efforts to fight non communicable diseases. However it is worth 
noting, that no tobacco company is a member of the GC, at least one illustration that a concerted 
policy among various UN agencies is possible.  
 
 
Assessing the Institutionalization of Soft Law by the Global 
Compact 
 
Obligation: The Compact’s ‘Carrots and Sticks’ Approach 
The Compact’s self-professed challenge at its inception was to implement existing norms 
effectively without being able to legally enforce them.
47
 It has been observed that ‘[t]he 
effectiveness of voluntary enforcement mechanisms... depends on the interests of competing 
firms.’48 By this logic, the Compact needs to make it in the interest of businesses themselves to 
live up to their commitments. Soft law initiatives have a variety of carrots and sticks at their 
disposal to help them achieve this. For the Compact, the ‘carrot’ approaches involve selling the 
advantages of its voluntary, flexible status to its participants. The ‘stick’ approaches involve 
sanctioning non-complying, free-riding companies by eroding their reputation and articulating 
precise regulations, thereby upholding the integrity and credibility of the initiative. Crucially, the 
‘carrot’ approaches were employed from the very outset to secure broad participation in the GC. 
It was only once this had been achieved that the ‘stick’ approaches were progressively ratcheted 
up to preserve the integrity of the initiative.  
 
The Carrots 
 
At its inception the coercive force of the Compact was relatively weak. It offered ‘carrots’ to its 
participants in the form of non-binding principles and autonomy regarding their implementation. 
The biggest carrot of all for companies was membership of the Global Compact itself - 
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corporations could enhance the value of their brand by associating themselves with the Compact. 
It also provided interactive forums for its participants to facilitate dialogue and promote the 
sharing of CSR strategies. By allowing those regulated to retain autonomy in terms of how they 
incorporate the ten principles into their everyday practices, the Global Compact does not alienate 
potential participants. Certain scholars believe that corporations quite simply would not sign up 
to the Compact if a legal obligation was imposed,
49
 and there is evidence to support this theory. 
The binding nature of the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights’, introduced in 2003 by the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission, meant that the initiative met with firm resistance from most 
businesses and suffered as a result.
50
 The danger of imposing forms of legalization scoring too 
high on the ‘obligation’ dimension was also highlighted by the unwillingness of developed states 
to legally bind themselves to the Principle of Non-Reciprocal Preferential Treatment of 
Developing States in the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.
51
 Companies 
prefer that their activities are not subject to the decisions of an external force. The Compact 
appears to have taken this message on board by initially prioritising high participation over 
enforcement integrity before redressing the balance once enough companies are signed up.
52
  
 
The Sticks 
 
The balance was redressed through progressively more advanced and onerous ‘stick’ tactics. The 
GC did employ coercion in a negative sense from the outset, but this was initially limited to 
monitoring of company behaviour by NGOs and the media, together with the reputational 
sanctions that ensued for socially irresponsible practices. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 
suggest that activist networks employ a variety of tactics designed to hold the actors they 
scrutinise to account. These tactics include ‘leverage politics.’ This involves the ‘mobilisation of 
shame’, where ‘the behaviour of actors is held up to the bright light of international scrutiny.’53 
The effectiveness of these activist networks lies in employing what Joseph Nye sees as a classic 
feature of ‘soft power’; using the ‘hard power’ of another actor (in this case, a company’s high 
brand equity) against it as a means to obtain a desired outcome.
54
 A state signing up to a 
voluntary agreement has been described as offering its ‘reputation for living up to its 
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commitments as a form of collateral,’ where ‘failure to live up to one’s commitments harms ones 
reputation and makes future commitments less credible.’55 This principle applies to an even 
greater extent to large companies, given the enormous value and investment placed in their 
corporate image. 
 
As the Compact has developed, its mechanisms for inflicting reputational sanctions on its non-
complying participants have become progressively more onerous. The GC’s initial refusal to 
publicly shame those failing to file annual progress reports was seen as a major weakness.
56
 
However, now that it has attracted a plethora of participants, the initiative has toughened its 
stance. As part of the 2005 reforms, ‘Integrity Measures’ were introduced stating that any 
company missing two consecutive deadlines would be labelled publicly as ‘non-communicating’ 
on the Global Compact website, the only exception being for those companies lacking the 
capacity to report or communicate fully. To reinforce this, a more detailed and transparent 
system for reviewing complaints has been put into place. Initially, the Global Compact adopted a 
‘softly-softly’ approach: it forwarded substantiated complaints to the company concerned, and it 
requested information on the company’s plans to rectify the situation, possibly providing 
guidance to assist the company in this process. However, failure on the part of the company to 
enter into dialogue can result in them being labelled ‘inactive’ or even removed from the list of 
Global Compact participants, a process known as being ‘delisted.’57 The complaints procedure 
works primarily because it is in the interests of both advocacy networks and rival companies to 
see an offending participant held to account for its violations. Other firms lose out when their 
competitors succeed in evading their responsibilities.
58
 The 2005 reforms provided for ‘the 
possibility of filing complaints of systematic or egregious abuse of the Compact’s overall aims 
and principles to the Global Compact Office against any participating company.’59 To reinforce 
this, a more detailed and transparent system for reviewing complaints has been put into place.
60
  
Finally, since 2005 the ‘Policy on the Use of the Compact Name and Logos’ has provided 
‘specific and detailed examples of circumstances under which and in what way the display of the 
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logos will be generally permitted or not be allowed respectively.’ The Financial Times reports 
that in 2010 55 companies were delisted for their failure to provide a communication on 
progress.
61
 Prior to this, the Compact was strongly criticised for allowing participating 
companies to ‘blue-wash’ their socially irresponsible activities through association with the 
initiative. Critics have argued that through associating themselves with the U.N., companies 
could gain favourable publicity by ‘wrapping themselves in the flag of the United Nations’ 
without taking any substantial steps to improve their behaviour. An illustration of this argument 
is the Austrian Bank ‘Bawag’, which joined the Global Company in March 2009 after its senior 
management was sentenced to prison for serious fraud and damages worth 1.7 billion Euro in 
2008. ‘Bawag’s’ membership to the GC may be read as an effort to help reposition the bank and 
regain again some sort of credibility as the ‘new Bawag’ that is strongly decoupled from the 
‘old’ Bawag, associated with fraud and corruption.  Bruno and Karliner again argue that the U.N. 
demonstrated ‘poor judgment in allowing executives such as Nike’s Phil Knight to be 
photographed with Mr Annan in front of the U.N. flag, without any substantial effort by the 
company to adhere to the Global Compact principles.
62
 ’Since the 2005 reforms, therefore, the 
negative coercive pressure applied by the Compact has been significantly strengthened. Given 
the more stringent mechanisms for inflicting reputation sanctions on its lagging participants that 
are described above, we argue that the Compact’s norms have moved from a low position  to a 
moderate position  on the sliding scale of ‘obligation.’  
 
Moral shaming works. An excellent example of this is the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). Set up by the UK-based NGO ‘Global Witness’, the EITI sets an international 
standard for companies in the extractive sector to publish what they pay and what governments 
receive from oil, gas and mining contracts. Despite its purely voluntary status, the EITI has been 
a huge success story. Since 2006, 29 countries have applied to become EITI compliant, and in 
February this year Azerbaijan became the first country to complete the intensive validation 
process.
63
 Why are resource-rich developing countries bending over backwards to comply with a 
voluntary standard created by small Western NGO? In his recent lecture at Oxford University, 
Paul Collier suggests that it is because the EITI ‘sorts the sheep out from the goats. The decent 
governments sign up, and that then reveals the ones that refused to sign up as just what they are.’ 
As he argues in his recent book ‘The Bottom Billion’, ‘[n]orms are effective because they are 
enforced by peer pressure... An international charter gives people something very concrete to 
demand: either the government adopts it or it must explain why it hasn’t’.64 The same can be said 
of the GC, except we replace the word ‘government’ with ‘corporation.’ The beauty of the 
concept is that it costs next to nothing to implement; it simply relies on the scrutiny of advocacy 
networks that are already in place, and the desire of the actors regulated to be seen as good 
global citizens. It seems likely that this mechanism accounts for at least some of the 
extraordinary growth the Compact has achieved since its inception. The number of signatories 
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has risen from an initial figure of 38 at its official launch in July 2000, to a present total of over 
4,700.
65
  
 
Precision: The Compact’s Best Practice & Engagement Opportunities 
 
Although the Global Compact has specified its intended objectives in the form of its ten 
governing principles, these are set out in extremely vague, one-sentence terms, and initially the 
means by which companies were supposed to achieve these goals were not articulated. The 
second principle, for example, states that businesses should ‘make sure that they are not 
complicit in any human rights abuses,’66 but the Compact makes it in no way explicit how the 
respect for this principle should be translated into practice. Unsurprisingly, the Compact has 
been heavily criticised for failing to define the obligations of its participants in a more detailed 
manner. Such critics view low ‘precision’ scores as a clear weakness; an ‘impediment to 
effective implementation’ of the Compact’s overarching aim to get companies to embrace its 
core values. They see voluntary codes as frequently amounting to little more than ‘vague 
statements of principle that cannot provide reliable guidelines for behaviour in concrete 
situations.’67  
 
However, these criticisms miss an important point, which is that these ten one-sentence 
principles are merely intended as a starting point. Detailed ideas for further Corporate Social 
Responsibility projects may be quickly and easily developed (and, crucially, reformed), given 
that the more formal, bureaucratic policy instruments of hard law initiatives are avoided.
68
 A 
parallel here may be drawn with the discretion provided by the Stability and Growth Pact, where 
‘scope for reform without resort to formal legal changes is possible and more likely than if 
formal legal instruments... had to be reformed.’69 As Georg Kell, Executive Director of the 
Compact, points out: ‘[t]he rapid evolution of the Compact stands in stark contrast to the 
cumbersome task of establishing regulation, and highlights the advantage of voluntary initiatives' 
flexibility.’70 Given that the whole concept of Corporate Social Responsibility is still in its 
embryonic stages, it makes eminent sense to limit the degree of rigid, detailed ex ante legislation 
and instead to incrementally develop more precise norms through stakeholder dialogue ‘free of 
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‘command and control.’71 This is where the Compact’s function as an interactive forum for 
discussion and learning plays such an important role. At the GC’s inception it was imperative not 
to alienate businesses through legally binding mechanisms, rather to progressively generate 
detailed ideas for socially responsible behaviour with them as willing, engaged parties to the 
process. If this had not been achieved, the initiative would have fallen at the first hurdle. The 
Compact recognised the need to get the Corporate Social Responsibility ball rolling with 
companies on its side. 
 
Thus, critics fail to appreciate that the GC’s so-called ‘vagueness’ presents significant 
advantages. The low ‘precision’ score of the Global Compact principles encourages widespread 
corporate participation in the initiative.  Rather than alienate companies by scaring them away 
with detailed rules, the Global Compact gives them the autonomy to implement its principles in 
different ways, according to what works best in their industry and in the jurisdiction in which 
they operate. Comparisons can be made with the Open Method of Coordination governance 
system (OMC) operating within the European Union, which also allows for the flexible 
adaptation of policy initiatives according to the ‘diverse institutional arrangements, legal regimes 
and national circumstances in the member states.’72 The Compact shares the desire of the OMC 
to strike a balance between respecting the diversity of its participants, whilst retaining the 
advantages of collective action.
73
   
 
The Compact’s soft law instruments provide a variety of interactive platforms for participating 
companies to discuss and learn about Corporate Social Responsibility policies collectively. In 
doing so, the Compact’s value proposition falls squarely into companies’ needs.  An assessment 
of the motivations for firms to sign up to the Compact revealed that after the purpose of 
addressing humanitarian concerns, the next three motivations companies most frequently cited 
were: (1) the acquisition of practical know-how, (2) the opportunity to network with other 
organisations, and (3) to become more familiar with Corporate Social Responsibility practices.
74
 
Arguably, the most attractive feature of the Global Compact for its participants, therefore, is that 
it provides them with opportunities to engage in cooperative dialogue with other civil society 
actors (including other companies) and thereby learn about how they can best improve their 
Corporate Social Responsibility activities. These so-called ‘engagement opportunities’ fall into 
three principal categories.
75
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Firstly, the Compact has a system of ‘Learning Networks’. These are designed to ‘facilitate the 
progress of companies... with respect to implementation of the ten principles, while also creating 
opportunities for multi-stakeholder engagement and collective action’  The aim is to foster an 
environment in which companies are able to engage in a mutually beneficial information 
exchange An Annual Local Networks Forum is held every year to enable further networking and 
learning opportunities Secondly, the Compact organises Policy Dialogues, which allow for 
intensified exchange of ideas between businesses, government leaders, U.N. agencies, NGOs, 
academics and other actors. Such dialogues ‘focus on specific issues relating to globalisation and 
corporate citizenship’; past topics have included ‘The Role of the Private Sector in Zones of 
Conflict’ and ‘Business and Sustainable Development.’ From these Policy Dialogues, case 
studies of successful best practices can be sent to the Global Compact Office (Fritsch, 2008: 19). 
Finally, the Compact uses its website as repository of information. In addition to providing their 
mandatory annual Communication on Progress (COP), companies can also submit ‘case stories’ 
detailing specific actions they have taken to further their Corporate Social Responsibility 
commitments. There is a large public relations incentive for companies to deliver a detailed 
account of the improvements they have been making in their Corporate Social Responsibility 
practices: the Compact’s ‘Notable Program’ rewards outstanding COPs by publishing them in a 
special section on its website.
76
 
 
The principle advantage presented by the learning environment fostered through soft law 
mechanisms is that it provides scope for the ‘precision’ score of the norms generated to be 
progressively increased as detailed, universally agreed norms and standards of practice.
77
 Also in 
this regard the Global Compact may be compared with the Open Method of Coordination 
governance system (OMC) operating within the European Union (OMC), for which ‘[t]he 
objective is not to prescribe uniform rules,’ but to organise ‘a learning process in order to 
promote the exchange of experiences and best practices.’78 It is important to highlight that the 
creation of any detailed best practices would almost certainly be impossible to achieve through a 
hard law initiative, given the reluctance of companies to bind themselves to precise legal 
obligations. As companies progressively acquire experience in the field of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and disseminate this information through the channels that the Compact has put in 
place, ideas and standards evolve. As Ann Florini notes, ‘[t]he dispute over exactly what... 
standards should be- and who should decide- has just begun.’79 Corporate strategies, structures 
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and production processes are subject to constant and fast-paced change. It therefore makes sense 
to have a malleable, adaptable body of knowledge which can be added to as new norms are 
generated, rather than a rigid system of legally binding legislation.
80
 The latter system would 
quickly become obsolete as the principles it espoused became dated and redundant. The Compact 
therefore adopts the more realistic strategy of attempting to generate consensus around 
progressively more precise soft law norms. 
 
As multi-stakeholder dialogue continues to become more sophisticated and as managers become 
more aware of the needs of their constituencies the hope is that different, industry-specific 
behavioural norms will emerge in a ‘bottom-up’ fashion and will become embedded within the 
culture of that particular industry. As Hassel puts it, ‘[a] plethora of voluntarist initiatives [will] 
converge over time on a shared understanding,’81 which will enjoy a great deal of legitimacy and 
could eventually harden into more formal legal codes.
82
 However, this does not need to be the 
endgame. Voluntary standards will continue to have value even if they never become binding, 
given that companies still have a reputation-based incentive to conform to them, or at least 
attempt to conform.  
 
As the initiative has evolved, ‘engagement opportunities’ such as Learning Networks, Annual 
Local Networks Forums and Policy Dialogues have yielded case studies and evolving standards 
of ‘best practice’ in various CSR fields. These mechanisms have at the same time created a 
market for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Accounting Firm KPMG grasped the business 
opportunity to advise other firms on CSR initiatives and Swiss Bank UBS has issued CSR 
related investment products, illustrating how business and public policy are increasingly 
interwoven. 
 
The standards, coupled with the annual COPs, have thus served both, detailed examples of how 
Compact participants can best achieve the principles to which they are committed and new 
business opportunities for adhering firms. The Compact has boosted the ‘precision’ score of its 
norms since 2005 by providing detailed examples of what constitutes a learning network and 
what constitutes a misuse of its name and logo. The GC’s norms on the precision scale have 
moved from an initial position where it was extremely difficult to identify what conduct did or 
did not constitute compliance with GC principles (given their vagueness and the initial lack of 
guidelines), to a position where detailed standards have developed in a number of different 
fields. We therefore argue that the evolution of these non-binding norms shifts them from a low 
to a moderate ‘precision’ score.  
 
Delegation 
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The Compact delegates very little dispute resolution authority to third parties. The only 
mechanism that even approaches such a delegation is the possibility of the Compact initiating 
legal proceedings against a company in the event of a misuse of its name of logo, and this is 
articulated in extremely vague terms.
83
 As a result, it is difficult to give the Compact’s norms 
anything other than a low score for the first element of the ‘delegation’ dimension.  
 
On the second element, however, the norms score higher. The ‘Rule Making and 
Implementation’ scale runs from soft forms of legalization that constitute ‘normative statements’ 
to the hardest forms which are ‘binding regulations’ with ‘centralised enforcement’. We would 
argue that the external ‘engagement opportunities’ provided by the Compact are no longer 
simply ‘negotiations forums’ (right at the bottom of the scale), but have evolved into providing 
‘coordination standards’ to companies in the form of best practices. It has also been shown that 
in carrying out their ‘shaming’ function, advocacy networks such as NGOs and the media have 
been delegated a role of ‘monitoring and publicity’ (positioned in the middle of the scale) to 
ensure corporate compliance with the GC principles. 
 
In this context it is important to highlight the value of the ‘spotlight effect.’84 in keeping Global 
Compact participants honest. Keck and Sikkink note that once companies have publicly 
committed themselves to the ten principles, advocacy networks can use their position and 
command of information ‘to expose the distance between discourse and practice.’85 Such groups 
will not accept participants’ COPs at face value; they will scrutinize them and apply severe 
pressure in the event that a high profile company fails to live up to its commitments. Despite its 
voluntary status, the Compact is able to rely on watchdog organisations such as Corpwatch and 
Dissident Voice to employ confrontational strategies such as ‘documentation of abuses and 
moral shaming.’86 For example, the online publication ‘Multinational Monitor’ publishes a 
notorious annual list of the ten worst companies in that year. Appearing on that list is a public 
relations nightmare for any company. The beauty of ‘moral shaming’ as an enforcement strategy 
is that it costs next to nothing to implement; it simply relies on the scrutiny of advocacy 
networks that are already in place, and the desire of the actors regulated to be seen as good 
global citizens. It seems likely that this mechanism accounts for at least some of the 
extraordinary growth the Compact has achieved since its inception. The number of signatories 
has risen from an initial figure of 38 at its official launch in July 2000, to a present total of over 
4,700.
87
 Overall, therefore, we argue that the Compact has moved from a low to a slightly more 
moderate ‘delegation’ score.  
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Conclusion 
 ‘A Mountain Biker cannot start a journey in sixth gear’ - The Global 
Compact’s Governance Structures for Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
The GC at its inception can be likened to a mountain biker at the start of his or her journey. 
The gears on the bike represent the legalization spectrum; first gear is prototypical soft law 
and sixth gear is prototypical hard law. The mountain biker cannot start her/his journey in 
sixth gear; there is insufficient momentum to propel him forward, so he makes little or no 
progress. A far more effective technique is to move up steadily through the gears as 
progressively more momentum is generated. In gradually hardening its norms as momentum 
is gained (i.e. as participation increases), this is precisely what the Compact’s strategy has 
been. It still positions itself as a ‘learning network’ in order to reap the benefits of soft law 
that have been referred to in this essay. However, it strikes a balance between embracing 
business through softer measures, and ensuring the commitment of participants to its 
objectives, which has required a progressive shift up to more moderate forms of legalization. 
The GC is trying to push companies as hard as possible to abide by its principles without 
alienating them from the initiative.  
 
Having attracted corporate participants with its very soft initial legalization and ‘voluntary-
engagement’ discourse, the GC has shifted from a soft to a moderate position on the legalization 
spectrum, and has reinforced this transition with a ‘toughened-stance’ discourse. An overall 
analysis of the GC as a Governance structure of corporate social responsibility through the 
mechanisms provided by soft law reveals that the initiative has moved from an extremely soft 
initial position on all three scales, obligation, precision and delegation, to a more moderate 
stance. The choice between soft and hard law is not binary. Consequently, ‘collective action’ 
initiatives laying down norms or regulations will ultimately seek a balanced position on the three 
sliding scales of obligation, precision and delegation that provides them with the most effective 
means of attaining their objectives. Put another way, they will look for a ‘compromise between 
the rigidities of hard law and the uncertainties associated with a more discretionary approach.’88 
The shift in strategy is summarised in the diagram below. 
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Since 2005 the Global Compact Moved From a Low to a 
More Moderate Position on the Legalization Spectrum
Low Obligation
Based on Abbott & Snidal, 2000
Ensure broad participation 
through framing as a 
Soft voluntary initiative & stronger
Emphasis on ‘carrots’ rather than on ‘sticks’
Moderate Obligation
With broad participation 
assured, more emphasis 
on ‘naming & shaming’ 
Creation of a Formal 
Complaints Procedure
Low Precision
Issue vague, one sentence principles
Provide no explanation of
how Firms can
achieve these goals 
Low  Delegation
Delegate very little dispute 
resolution authority to third 
parties 
Moderate Delegation
Compact  increasingly 
delegates ‘enforcement’ to 
Media & NGOs
Uses ‘Spotlight Effects’
Moderate Precision
Compact  puts cases, 
on its website, 
lets firms report on 
how they translate principles
into practice
Offers a system of Learning 
Networks & organizes Policy 
Dialogues
Compact’s Initial Position
Position 
Since 2005
 
 
It appears that the GC’s strategy has involved starting off as an ‘engager’, attracting companies 
to the initiative’s soft law  discourse, before progressively racketing up the ‘precision’ and 
‘obligation’ scores of its norms, binding its participants to stronger, more detailed commitments 
and becoming more of a ‘confronter’ (albeit a moderate one) once the initiative secured a broad 
participation base.  
 
As companies progressively acquire experience in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility 
and disseminate this information through the channels that the Compact has put in place, ideas 
and standards will evolve. As Ann Florini notes, ‘[t]he dispute over exactly what... standards 
should be- and who should decide- has just begun.’89  Corporate strategies, structures and 
production processes are subject to constant and fast-paced change. It therefore makes sense to 
have a malleable, adaptable body of knowledge which can be added to as new norms are 
generated, rather than a rigid system of legally binding legislation.
90
 The latter system would 
quickly become obsolete as the principles it espoused became dated and redundant. The same 
philosophy lies behind the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the 
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framework accompanying the 1987 Montreal Protocol which was commonly recognised as one 
of the most successful international agreements ever entered into.
91
  
 
Soft Law - Not the Poor Relation 
 
In toughening its stance, the GC is getting closer to this limit. Yet by retaining the advantages of 
its voluntary status, it is an illustrative example of why soft law has been described as ‘one of the 
most significant institutional features of international relations.’92 Critics who scoff at the GC’s 
soft initial approach and argue that harder law should have been imposed from the outset seem to 
ignore the harsh truth that companies simply would not have signed up to be bound by harder 
norms, and the GC would have failed at the first hurdle.  
 
One of the most important lessons to take from the case study is that the use of soft law as a 
governance structure of international affairs should not be dismissed as a ‘Plan B’ in the event 
that harder law is not practical. Corporate social responsibility is a relatively recent phenomenon; 
clear benefits exist in starting an international regulatory mechanism at the softer end of the 
legalization spectrum, before toughening up later on.  
 
This essay is not holding up soft law as the ideal means to ensure effective collective action on 
corporate social responsibility. Indeed, detailed research is necessary to explore the extent to 
which soft law initiatives such as the GC have actually succeeded in changing the day-to-day 
operating practices of the companies regulated, beyond the rhetoric of the annual company 
reports. In a perfect world, businesses would be legally bound to engage in ethically sound 
practices from the outset. However, this essay attempts to make a case for soft law’s immense 
value in the global governance of corporations, particularly as a starting point for initiatives such 
as the GC. In this context it should not be seen as merely ‘a poor relation of hard law’; on the 
contrary, in many instances it is deliberately and consciously selected as the most effective 
means available to achieve a desired objective.
93
 Despite the obvious limitations of a softer 
approach, any project designed to foster collective international action must initially adopt the 
philosophy that ‘you catch more flies with honey’ to ensure it attracts a sufficient following to 
get off the ground, before tightening the screw on its participants at a later stage.  
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